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A
long history of debate exists among macroeconomists regarding the
degreetowhichpubliccapitalcontributestooveralleconomicactivity.
Estimates of the output elasticity with respect to public capital range
anywhere from 0.06 in early work by Ratner (1983) to as high as 0.39 in a
widely cited study byAschauer (1989).This elasticity refers to the percentage
change in GDP induced by a given percentage change in government capital.1
Glomm and Ravikumar (1997, 197) remark that economists have generally
been skeptical of Aschauer’s estimate, mainly because “the productivity of
public capital is simply not believed to be larger than the productivity of the
private capital stock (which is roughly 0.36).” That being said, few would
argue that public infrastructure plays no productive role, and estimates of the
public capital elasticity of output lying between 0.05 and 0.15 are often put
forward.2
In an economy where government investment in equipment and struc-
tures complements private investment, it is only natural to ask what factors
determine the optimal share of public investment in output. The trade-off in-
volves public capital that is productive but that must also be ﬁnanced through
distortional taxation.
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Thus, if y = xθ, ε = θ.
2 See Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for a survey of recent estimates.
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The literature has shown that the optimal share of gross public investment
should equal the government capital elasticity of output. However, most in-
ﬂuential papers in this literature utilize a very special class of growth models:
endogenous growth models without transition dynamics.3 In these models,
the elasticities of output with respect to private and public capital must add
up to one. This restriction is empirically implausible because the private cap-
ital elasticity of output is approximately 0.36 in the U.S. economy. Thus, if
this restriction were true, then the optimal share of public investment in GDP
would be 0.64.
In this article, we show that this implausible restriction is an implication
of the lack of transition dynamics. We revisit the optimal choice of public
investment in a more general and plausible model that allows for gradual tran-
sitions between steady states. Since endogenous growth is not essential to our
argument, we revert to the more conventional growth model with exogenous
technical progress.
Contrary to previous work, we show that (i) the optimal share of gross
public investment in output should be less than its elasticity along a balanced
growthpath; (ii)thissharedependsinimportantwaysonassumedpreferences
and technology, including the underlying rate of productivity growth; (iii) the
optimalsequenceofpublicinvestmentsisnottimeinvariant, andfurthermore,
a policy aimed at implementing it is not time consistent; and (iv) the govern-
ment capital elasticity of output is likely to be relatively low at less than 0.1
if the observed U.S. ratios of gross public investment to output and of public
capital to private capital are approximately optimal.
This article is organized as follows: Section 1 gives an overview of public
investment in U.S. data. Section 2 sets the basic theoretical framework and
derives the optimal steady state share of public investment in output. In con-
trast, Section 3 describes the solution to the full optimal policy problem with
commitment. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
1. PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN U.S. DATA
Panel A in Figure 1 depicts the behavior of U.S. gross public investment
relative to GDP during the postwar period. Observe ﬁrst that the degree of
public investment in the United States is nonnegligible and roughly compara-
ble as a percentage of GDP to that of its net exports. Public investment has
amounted to as much as 6 percent of GDP at its peak in the 1950s, but it has
alsobeenrelativelyconstant. Therun-upinpublicinvestmentapparentduring
the 1950s and early 1960s captures a discrete increase in military spending
related to the Korean War, as well as increases in spending on schools and
3 See Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), and Aschauer (2000), among many others.P.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 35
Figure 1 Public Investment and Public Capital over the Postwar Period
highways. Outside of changes in military spending over time, the share of
public investment in output has stayed mostly ﬂat at approximately 3 percent.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows the ratio of public to private capital from 1947
to today. Abstracting from public capital tied to national defense, which
includes aircrafts, ships, vehicles, electronic equipment, and missiles, this
ratio has never shown much variation, moving only between 0.20 and 0.25
during the entire period. We see a slight run-up in public capital during the
mid-1960s, which corresponds to the construction of the interstate highway
system. Interestingly, Fernald (1999) suggests that this construction provided
a signiﬁcant onetime increase in productivity. Note in Panel C in Figure 1 that
private investment relative to output has always been much larger than public
investment, averaging around 15 percent since World War II.
Thefactthatsomedegreeofpublicinvestmenthasconsistentlytakenplace
over the years suggests that the provision of infrastructure such as highways,
airports,andevenpublicsectorresearchanddevelopmentindeedcontributesto
economic activity. Thus, we will now study a simple economic environment
where public capital plays a productive role and examine the factors that
determine efﬁcient public investment.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Consider a closed economy in which a large number of ﬁrms produce a single




where 0 <α<1 and 0 <θ<1 − α. The condition θ<1 − α prohibits
the possibility of endogenous growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995],
153). In equation (1), Kt and Kgt denote private and public capital at time t,
respectively, and ztlt represents the quantity of skill-weighted labor input. We
allow for exogenous technical progress in the use of labor input, lt, so that zt
grows at a constant rate over time:
zt = γ zzt−1, γ z > 1, and z0 = 1. (2)
This feature of the technology will make it possible for the economy to expe-
rience balanced growth in the long run at a rate related to γ z. We treat Kgt as
a pure public good that enhances each ﬁrm’s production.4
We assume that public investments are ﬁnanced by a ﬂat tax on income,
0 <τ t < 1, that can vary with time. Hence, we can express new outlays of
public capital, Kgt+1,a s
Kgt+1 = τtYt     
Public Investment
+ (1 − δ)Kgt, (3)
Kg0 > 0 given,
where 0 <δ<1. Observe that τt also represents the share of gross public
investment in GDP. Our main objective is to characterize the efﬁcient ratio of
public investment to output.
Firms
Let rt and Wt denote, respectively, the rental price of private capital and the
wage at date t. Then, taking as given the sequence {rt, Wt}∞
t=0, each ﬁrm





gt − rtKt − Wtlt. (4)




4 Thus, we abstract from congestion considerations and think of the aggregate stock of public
capital as being available to all ﬁrms. This assumption typically subjects the economic environment
to scale effects with respect to steady state allocations since public infrastructure is non-rival (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1992]).P.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 37
and






The economy is inhabited by a large number of identical households. Their







, with σ>0, (7)
where 0 <β<1 is a subjective discount rate. At each date, households
decide how much to consume or save and how much capital to rent to ﬁrms.
Each household is assumed to be endowed with one unit of time that they
supply inelastically. Their budget constraint is given by
Ct + It = (1 − τt)[Wtlt + rtKt], (8)
where
Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt, (9)
K0 > 0 given.
In equation (8), Ct and It denote consumption and gross investment, re-
spectively. Before proceeding with the household’s problem, we ﬁnd it useful
to ﬁrst derive the economy’s constant balanced growth rate in the steady state.
This will allow us to deﬁne a normalization of the economy’s variables that
will show explicitly why the optimal rate of public investment may depend
on the exogenous rate of technical progress, γ Z > 1. We denote the long-run
growth rate of a given variable x by γ x.
Equation(3)impliesthatifpublicinvestmentultimatelygrowsatthecon-
stant rate γ Ig, then γ Ig = γ Kg. In addition, the household’s budget constraint
(8) implies that γ C = γ I = γ Ig = γ Y so that γ Kg = γ Y.5 Since equation
(9) also means that γ I = γ K, we further have that γ K = γ Y. Therefore, in
the end, all variables in the economy grow at the common growth rate γ Y.T o




















5 Note that Wtlt + rtKt = Yt.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Since γ Kg = γ Y = γ K above, we can immediately obtain the economy’s





Given this growth rate, a sensible normalization for our economy is one that
expresses our model’s variables in detrended form. Speciﬁcally, for any vari-
able Xt that grows at rate γ along the balanced growth path, we express its




In the steady state, detrended variables will then be constant, while non-
detrended variables will grow at the constant rate, γ.6
Taking the sequence of prices {rt,wt}∞
t=0, as well as the sequence of tax
rates {τt}∞
















ct + γk t+1 − (1 − δ)kt = (1 − τt)[wtlt + rtkt], (12)
k0 > 0 given.







(1 − τt+1)rt+1 + 1 − δ
 
. (13)
In the above expression, taxes distort private incentives to consume and
save but also ﬁnance public infrastructure that raises future returns to private
investment; recall that rt+1 = αk
α−1
t+1 kθ
gt+1. Given this trade-off, how should
society choose the share of public investment in output? An intuitive answer
to this question might be to select the ratio of public investment to output that
maximizes steady state welfare. This captures perhaps the simplest notion
of optimal policy. We show that such intuition indeed replicates conventional
wisdomobtainedfromendogenousgrowthframeworks. However, inbothour
modelandendogenousgrowthsettings,ignoringtransitiondynamicsturnsout
to have crucial implications for policy.
6 Observe that if Xt grows at the rate γ, then Xt = γtX0. Therefore xt = Xt
γt = X0.
7 It should be noted that the modiﬁed discount rate, β∗, implicitly imposes a restriction on
the extent of technical progress, since γ(1−σ) must be less than 1/β in order that the maximization
problem be well deﬁned.P.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 39
The Decentralized Steady State Equilibrium and a
Policy Golden Rule
We can describe the decentralized steady state equilibrium of the environment
laid out in this section most easily as a vector {c,i,k,kg} such that, given a
constant share of public investment in output, τ,8
A) γ = β∗  
(1 − τ)αkα−1kθ
g + 1 − δ
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Conditions A) and B) are the households’long-run consumption/savings
decision and budget constraint, respectively. Conditions C) and D) are the
normalized accumulation equations for private and public capital.
By combining conditions A) and D), and given the deﬁnition of β∗,i ti s
















In particular, the higher the tax rate, the more public investment takes place
and the higher the steady state ratio of public to private capital. Furthermore,






β − (1 − δ)
 1−θ  
τ
γ − (1 − δ)
 θ
. (15)
Observe in the equation above that k is a strictly concave function of τ.
In particular, setting τ = θ maximizes the steady state quantity of private
capital. Furthermore, we can make use of conditions A), B), and C) to solve
















1 − βγ(1−σ) 
(1 − σ)
, (16)
8 We use the expression “decentralized” to emphasize that steady state allocations obtain from
household and ﬁrm optimization conditional on policy.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
so that U depends on τ only through private capital. Because U is a strictly
increasingfunctionofk,whilek isconcaveinτ,settingτ = θ alsomaximizes
steady state welfare.
To recapitulate, we have just shown in an exogenous growth context that
along the balanced growth path, the optimal share of gross public investment
inoutput,τ,mustequalthepubliccapitalelasticityofoutput,θ. Asithappens,
thisisequivalenttothefulloptimizingsolutioninanendogenousgrowthmodel
without transition dynamics. Since endogenous growth requires α + θ = 1,
and since α is approximately 0.36 in the U.S. economy, endogenous growth
models imply that the optimal share of public investment in output should
be 0.64, an implausibly large number.9 Nothing in our exogenous growth
framework requires that α + θ = 1, and consequently, τ does not have to be
implausibly large at 1 − α.
There remains, however, another empirical puzzle to solve. Most esti-
mateswouldplaceθ between0.05and0.15. Incontrast, wehaveseenthatthe
share of gross public investment in output (τ in our model) has consistently
remainedonlyaround0.03overthepostwarperiod. Toaddressthispuzzle,we
now study the full welfare-maximizing policy problem that takes into account
both steady state considerations and transition dynamics.
3. EFFICIENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT WITH COMMITMENT:
THE RAMSEY PROBLEM
Unfortunately, there is no simple way to characterize the Ramsey problem for
our economy. Setting up and solving the full welfare maximization problem,
however,allowsustoaddressexplicitlytwoimportantnotionsassociatedwith
efﬁcient policy.
First, we show why the efﬁcient sequence of public investment is not time
consistent. Second,weexplainwhyWoodford’s(1999)“timelessperspective”
provides potentially one answer to this problem. In essence, the timeless
perspective advocates the implementation of the steady state solution to the
Ramsey problem at all dates. It thus considers optimality from the vantage
point of a date far in the past. Because the implied policy is one to which any
welfare-maximizing government would have wished to commit itself on that
date in the past, this solution concept avoids the problem of time consistency.
We will now address these issues in detail.
9An implicit assumption here is that the share of private capital is measured adequately. An
alternative model that allowed for investment in human capital might allow θ to be signiﬁcantly
less than 0.64. Indeed, with a broader concept of capital that allowed for not only physical but
also human capital, the share of capital in output might be closer to 0.75 (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin [1992, 38]). Observe also that in an endogenous growth model that allowed for transition
dynamics (i.e., where the balanced growth path was reached asymptotically), the full welfare-
optimizing solution would not necessarily prescribe τ = θ at all dates.P.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 41
Consider a benevolent government that, at date zero, is concerned with
choosing a sequence of tax rates consistent with the development of public
infrastructure that maximizes household welfare. In choosing policy, this
government takes as given the decentralized behavior of ﬁrms and households
in the spirit of Chamley (1986). We further assume that at date zero, it can
credibly commit to any sequence of policy actions. The problem faced by this
benevolent government would then be to maximize (11) subject to equations
(12), (13), and (3) (in normalized form), and the corresponding Lagrangean




























β∗tµ3t[(1 − τt)yt + (1 − δ)kt − γk t+1 − ct],
where yt = kα
t l1−α
t kθ
gt and rt = α(yt/kt).
The ﬁrst constraint in (17) makes clear that our benevolent planner takes
households’ consumption/savings behavior as given. It can, however, inﬂu-
encetheintertemporalallocationstheychoosebyalteringtaxpolicyovertime.
The optimal selection of τt is governed by the following two equations:
∂L
∂τt








= 0 ∀t>0. (19)
Thefactthattheseﬁrstorderconditionsdifferfort = 0andt>0suggests
an incentive to take advantage of initial conditions in the ﬁrst period with the
promise never to do so in the future. It is exactly in this sense that the optimal
policy is not time consistent, since once date zero has passed, a new planner
wishingtosolvefortheoptimalpolicyatsomedatet>0wouldalwayschoose
ataxrateonthatdatedifferentfromwhathadbeenprescribedattimezero. For
the purpose of this section, therefore, we imagine that the optimization takes
place only once, in period zero. Once our benevolent planner has decided on
a course of action, his hands are tied and he is precommitted to that course of
action.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It should be noted that the choice of τt introduces a lagged predetermined
variable, µ1,t−1 ≥ 0. At a purely mechanical level, the corresponding ini-
tial condition, µ1,−1, serves as an artiﬁcial device that helps make stationary
the ﬁnal system of difference equations that characterizes the optimal solu-
tion. However, unlike with fundamental state variables such as the private
or public capital stock, this initial condition is not arbitrary. Instead, since
the optimal choice of τ0 should satisfy equation (18), it must be the case that
µ1,t−1 = 0 in (19) at t = 0. Alternatively, Dennis (2001, 6) points out that the
lagged Lagrange multiplier, µ1,t−1, may be interpreted as the “current value
of promises not to exploit the initial state” and, in particular, to abide by past
commitments. However, since no history exists prior to period zero, there are
no past commitments on which to assign any value at that date. It is optimal,
therefore, to set µ1,−1 = 0.
The fact that the optimal policy is chosen once and for all in period zero
does not necessarily imply that it is not ﬂexible. On the contrary, the solution
to the Ramsey problem provides a description of where to set τt in every state
of the world. We shall see that it is also explicit about how the share of public
investment in output depends on the economic environment. Therefore, as
noted in Dennis (2001, 6), “if a change to one or more parameters takes place,
thepolicyruleautomaticallyreﬂectsthischange; [and]thereisnoneedforre-
optimization to take place.” Accordingly, the remaining ﬁrst order conditions













t [rt(1 − τt) + 1 − δ] + σγµ1tc−σ−1
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−µ3tγ + β∗µ3t+1
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= 0. (22)P.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 43
Withtheseﬁrstorderconditionsinhand,wenowturntothelong-runproperties
of the efﬁcient solution for public investment.
The Timeless Perspective and a Modiﬁed Policy
Golden Rule
Aswehavealreadyseen,oneofthefeaturesassociatedwiththeoptimalpolicy
described in this section is that it requires the policymaker to commit once
and for all to his chosen rule at time zero. That is, optimal commitments are
generally not time consistent. However, in the context of monetary policy,
Woodford (1999) points out that “the optimal commitment fails to be time
consistent only if the central bank considers ‘optimality’at each point in time
in a way that allows it to consider the advantages, from the vantage point of
that particular moment, of a policy change at that time that was not previously
anticipated.” One way around this problem, therefore, would be for the pol-
icymaker to adopt a pattern of behavior “to which it would have wished to
commititselftoatadatefarinthepast,contingentupontherandomeventsthat
have occurred in the meantime.” Woodford refers to this pattern of behavior
as the “timeless perspective.”
The attraction of Woodford’s timeless perspective is that it retains the so-
lution to the Ramsey problem as the concept of optimal policy while getting
rid of the unique nature of date zero. Two potential problems with the notion
of timeless perspective are that it may be consistent with multiple policy out-
comes (see Dennis 2001) and that welfare may be lower than that obtained
under alternative time consistent solutions (see Jensen and McCallum 2002).
Underthetimelessperspective,thepolicyrulemustensurethattheoptimal
stationary equilibrium is eventually reached or, if already reached, that it
continues in that state. In our context, the optimal stationary equilibrium is
givenbyavector{c,y,τ,k,kg,µ 1,µ 2,µ 3}thatsolvesequations(19)through
(22), along with the Euler equation (13), the resource constraint (12), the
equation describing the evolution of public capital (3) (in normalized form),
and the deﬁnition of output, yt = kα
t l1−α
t kθ
gt, all without time subscripts. The
optimalsteadystateequilibrium,therefore,canbecharacterizedasasystemof
eight equations in eight unknowns, which is shown in detail in theAppendix.
In the steady state, households’ optimal consumption/savings decisions







+ 1 − δ
 
= 0. (23)
Furthermore, theAppendix shows that the efﬁcient share of public investment








+ 1 − δ
 
= 0. (24)44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
It follows from equations (23) and (24) that the Ramsey solution equates the
after-tax return to private investment, (1−τ)α(y/k), with the marginal return
to public investment, θ(y/kg). Consequently, we can immediately pin down







As expected, the higher the tax rate, the more public capital can be generated
relative to private capital.
The idea that the after-tax return to private investment must equal the
marginal return to public investment at the optimum also helps determine the
efﬁcient share of public investment in output. Note that in our framework the
opportunity cost of one unit of resources invested in the public sector is the






      
return to private investment
=
γ
β∗ − (1 − δ). (26)
The marginal beneﬁt of investing one unit of resources in the public sector is
θ(y/kg), and since public capital accumulates according to the law of motion

















γ − (1 − δ)
γ σ
β − (1 − δ)
 
<θ. (28)
We can think of the equation above as a modiﬁed golden rule for policy.
Analogous to the modiﬁed golden rule for private capital in the one sector
growth model, the share of public investment in output given by (28) falls
short of the policy golden rule outlined in the previous section by an amount
thatdependsimportantlyondiscounting. Toseethis, observethatwhenδ = 1
in equation (28), τ =
 
βγ1−σ 
θ = β∗θ<θ . Moreover, from (14) and (25),





α(1 − β∗θ)       










infrastructure, and although public capital matters in production, the impa-
tience reﬂected in the rate of time preference means that it is not optimal toP.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 45
Figure 2 Efﬁcient Public Investment
reduce current consumption through higher taxes to reach this higher ratio of
public to private capital.
Relativetomostearlierwork, themodiﬁedpolicygoldenruleconditionis
an important one in at least two respects. First, it implies that a high elasticity
of output with respect to public capital, θ, does not necessarily have to trans-
late into a large share of public investment in output, τ. Therefore, observed
empirical estimates of θ lying between 0.05 and 0.15 do not have to be incon-
sistentwiththe0.03shareofpublicinvestmentinoutput. Second,theefﬁcient
share of public investment in GDP now depends on a variety of preference
and technology considerations, including exogenous productivity growth, the
rate of depreciation, and the coefﬁcient of intertemporal substitution.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Comparative Statics
Figure2depictstheeffectsofariseinexogenouslaborproductivitygrowthon
the efﬁcient ratio of public investment to output. We can see that an increase
in the rate of labor augmenting technical progress from γ to γ   raises both
the marginal cost,
γ






public investment. Intuitively, the returns to both types of capital increase,
and it is not clear whether investment in public capital should increase or fall.
Dependingonthedegreetowhichthemarginalcostofpublicinvestmentrises
in Figure 2, we can see that the optimal rate of public investment, τ∗, may
rise to τ  or instead decrease to τ  . In the case with 100 percent depreciation,
equation (28) reduces to τ∗ = βγ(1−σ)θ. Hence, it follows that
∂τ∗
∂γ




Put another way, when households are not particularly willing to substitute
consumption across time (i.e., 1/σ < 1), an increase in exogenous labor pro-
ductivitygrowthleadsthemtowanttoincreasepresentconsumptionrelativeto
output. Therefore, with fewer resources available for investment, the optimal
steady state share of public investment in output must fall.
Toconcludethissection, wecalibratetheaboveexampleinordertodeter-
minewhatvalueofθ isimpliedbythetheory. Weshallthinkofourbenchmark
as that of an economy resembling the United States. Other than for the public
capitalelasticityofoutput,θ,theparametervaluesoftheeconomyareselected
alongthelinesofconventionalgeneralequilibriumquantitativestudies. Thus,
a time period represents one quarter, and we set the subjective discount rate,
β, to 0.99. The share of private capital in output, α, is set to 1/3, and σ is
chosen so as to make the coefﬁcient of intertemporal substitution 1/2. Capital
isassumedtodepreciateata10percentannualrate. Welettherateoftechnical
progress vary so that the rate of growth in per capita output lies between zero
and 3.5 percent. In the United States, the rate of growth of per capita GDP
has averaged 2.5 percent since World War II.
Given these parameter values, equations (28) and (29) indicate that the
choice of θ simultaneously pins down two measures, namely, the share of
public investment in GDP and the ratio of public to private capital. There
is an obvious sense, then, in which our model can fail, since choosing θ to
match one measure for the United States would leave it free to miss its mark
on the other. We ﬁnd that setting the public capital elasticity of output to
0.06 helps generate a share of public investment in output between 3.3 and 4
percent as in U.S. data. This is shown in the upper left-hand panel of Figure 3.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that this same public capital elasticity of output leads to
a ratio of public to private capital that matches well U.S. postwar experience
at approximately 20 percent (see the upper right-hand panel of Figure 3).
We conclude that if the share of public investment and the ratio of public toP.-D. G. Sarte and J. Soares: Efﬁcient Public Investment 47
Figure 3 Steady State Responses to Changes in Labor
Productivity Growth
private capital are approximately efﬁcient in the United States, then the public
capital elasticity of output implied by the theory lies in the lower range of
most empirical estimates at around 0.06.
Figure 3 also shows that the efﬁcient share of public investment in GDP
fallswithincreasesinexogenouslaborproductivitygrowth. Atthesametime,
theconsumptiontooutputratiorisesinthelowerright-handpanelofFigure3.
In this calibrated example, as exogenous labor productivity growth increases,
householdscanaffordtoconsumemorerelativetooutputandbothprivateand
public investment as a fraction of GDP decreases.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. SUMMARY
In a setting where public infrastructure plays a productive role, we have char-
acterized the main features of efﬁcient public investment under commitment.
In contrast to most previous studies, we have shown that the optimal share
of public investment in output may be less than its elasticity in the long run
and, moreover, that this share may depend in important ways on assumed
preferences and technology. We have also stressed the crucial nature of the
commitment assumption, as the optimal sequence of public investments is
not time consistent. Finally, if the observed ratios of public investment to
GDP and of public to private capital are approximately optimal in the United
States,thenourmodelsuggeststhatthegovernmentcapitalelasticityofoutput
is likely to be relatively low at 0.06.
APPENDIX
As described in the text, the optimal stationary equilibrium in our framework
is a vector {c,y,τ, k,kg,µ 1,µ 2,µ 3} that solves eight equations. The ﬁrst
four equations are
y − kαl1−αkθ







+ 1 − δ
 
= 0 (32)
τy+ (1 − δ)kg − γk g = 0 (33)
(1 − τ)y+ (1 − δ)k − γk− c = 0. (34)
The next four equations are worked out in more detail.
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(α − 1)(1 − τ)+ µ2τ = 0. (35)
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− µ3 = 0,






− µ3 = 0. (37)


































































+ 1 − δ
 
= 0. (38)
This last equation and equation (32) imply that the Ramsey solution equates
the marginal return to government capital with the after-tax return to private
capital.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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